Levee Failures Along the Inner Harbor Navigation Channel in New Orleans

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## **Original Intent**

The lower third of the **IHNC** was intended to provide private wharf frontage for industrial warehouses, as shown here During the first 25 years, only one tenant purchased space, on the west side of the **IHNC** 







The IHNC was dredged as a trapezoidal channel with a single lock, in two sequences of excavation, undertaken between 1918-23. In Section III the channel was 330 feet wide, with a maximum depth of 30 feet over 150 feet. Side cast hydraulic fill formed levees on either side of the excavation.

## Stratigraphy in Vicinity of the IHNC Lock Structure



- Construction of the IHNC lock structure in 1919-23 proved troublesome, requiring 6 sheetpile bulkheads with raker braces and 6 rows of dewatering wells, with 5 monitoring wells along the centerline.
- Most of the problems were with two sequences of "running sands"



 After 5 years of construction costing \$20
million the IHNC was finally completed on May 5, 1923





The GIWW was cut in 1944, during WW2. The excavation of diagonal slips shown here occurred during the mid-1950s, before the MRGO was excavated in 1960-64.



 Aerial oblique view of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal between 1960-64, after the entry to the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Channel had been enlarged (upper right), connecting to the inner harbor area.

## Discontinuous nature of stratigraphy underlying New Orleans



The IHNC crossed thick sequences of point bar sands adjacent to the Mississippi River, then historic marshes (lowland backswamp), crossed the Gentilly-Sauvage distributary ridge, and thence into backswamps, before connecting to Lake Pontchartrain.



The units lying beneath the IHNC channel vary from the west to the east side





 Detail showing thickness of surficial peat in vicinity of the IHNC. Thickness varies from 0 to 12 feet along Section III, between Claiborne and Florida Avenues.

# **OVERVIEW:** East Side IHNC Failures During Hurricane Katrina

Same area after reflooding by Hurricane Rita in late September 2005

## East Side IHNC South Breach

Polluted and run-down industrial leases along east side of the IHNC were demolished and cleaned up in 2001-03, leaving exposed shell fill





## 1965 flooding

The Lower Ninth Ward was flooded by overtopping of the levees along the IHNC in 1947 and 1965

The levee was heightened using rolled fill after both floods

Sheetpiles added after Hurricane Camille in 1969



 Aerial view of the 900 ft long south breach of the Inner Harbor Navigation Channel (IHNC) in the Lower Ninth Ward. View looking south.



 ING 4727 was built in 1990 as a dry cargo cover-top barge with a steel hull. It was 200 feet long, 35 feet wide, and 12 ft high, with a a cargo volume of 84,659 ft<sup>3</sup> (1877 tons). It was being leased to Lafarge North America and was tied up along the MRGO-IGWW channel.



 Damage to concrete flood wall where ING 4727
Barge collided with it, along the south side of the IHNC adjacent to the Lower Ninth Ward



 Evidence of sustained overtopping of concrete flood wall along the IHNC in the Lower Ninth Ward. Scour holes usually limited to 1.5X height of the free fall (7.5 ft). This scour trench deepened to the north, as elevations dropped.



 Overtopping-induced failure of the flood wall on the west side of the IHNC, north of Florida Ave. This breach was only 65 feet wide. ANALYSES: East Side IHNC North Breach

### **East Side IHNC North Breach**



East Side IHNC North Breach, near Florida Ave. bridge and pumping station, during inflow. Note narrow chasm defined by this failure and dramatic flexure of the sheetpiles.

East Side IHNC North Breach, after de-watering. Note tunnel-like geometry of this narrow breach



Undrained shear strength vs depth at the East IHNC North Breach

**Blue lines** shows profile of CPT-1, with NGI tip corrections for the three units encountered

**Green line** shows strength profile selected by the NSF team

Red lines shows strength profile used by the IPET team; which allows a rotational stability failure sometime between 5:30 and 6:00 AM

## **Slope Analysis IHNC North Breach**



Critical stability conditions for East IHNC North Breach occur when the storm surge reaches +14 feet (MSL), which was not achieved until 9 AM. Note that the presumed failure surface passes through the marsh layer.

#### Hydrographs on IHNC



The storm surge caused by Katrina began three days before it made landfall, seen here as the gradual increase at left, about 0.32 ft/hr. Around midnight on August 29<sup>th</sup>, the rate increased 4X, to about 1.2 ft/hr. These rates and levels were used in our seepage analyses.





Boland Marine Site -EBIA

Upper-**Excavation of** contaminated fine-grained soils on water side of IHNC flood wall just prior to Katrina Lower -**Backfilling** with pervious sand





Old Cypress Swamp

The pre-Katrina excavations for the East Bank **Industrial Area** penetrated the old cypress swamp deposits, which lie beneath the **IHNC levee and** flood wall



Cross section used for limit equilibrium and coupled seepage analyses. Upper plot shows pore pressure versus horizontal distance and time for this section. Note modeling of pervious backfill at EBIA site.

### Severe hydraulic gradients for piping and uplift



Hydraulic gradients for the north breach on IHNC. Storm surge at +14.4ft (MSL). Maximum exit gradient on the upper levee toe is  $i_0 \approx 1.0$ , and  $i_0 \approx$ 1.5 to 2.5 in the lower toe area. The distal toe value could have been worse, depending on k value of backfill used on Jourdan Ave. drainage canal.

**Post Failure Analyses of** East Side IHNC South Breach **Possible failure modes:** Overtopping scour trench-induced flood wall failure; and Underseepage, piping and uplift induced translational stability failure Multiple failure modes likely competed with one another

# ANALYSES: Stability of Flood Wall - East IHNC South Breach





Plaxis soft soil constitutive modeling of 7.5 ft deep scour trench and 4.5 ft gap – deformed mesh – true scale (max displacement of embankment crest = 1.2 ft)



Shear strains predicted by the Plaxis model, assuming a 7.5 ft deep scour trench and 4.5 ft wall gap – using "best estimates" of c and phi – Factor of Safety = 1.10. Underseepage-induced pore pressure trapped along base of less pervious clay stratum, overlying the more pervious marsh deposits.



Leaning wall with 8.5 ft of gap – deformed mesh – true scale (max displacement = 1.71 ft)



Leaning wall with 8.5 ft of gap. Predicted shear strains using "best estimates" of c and phi. Factor of Safety now = 1.15

Coupled Seepage Analyses of Embankment along East IHNC South Breach

## East Bank IHNC South Breach



Geologic cross-section showing projections of borings and tentative stratigraphic correlations for the 800 ft long IHNC East Bank-South Breach, adjacent to the Lower Ninth Ward



The porous and *highly conductive* nature of the backswamp deposits was revealed during post-Katrina drilling and sampling operations.
Highly conductive in horizontal plane, especially, parallel to original surface drainage.

## Anisotropy of backswamp deposits



Sudden die-off of organics creates highly anisotropic fabric; preferentially layered



 Drainage swales in the backswamps are subject to sieving of fines by runoff
This causes hydraulic conductivity to increase along the runoff path, as opposed to other seepage paths, within the plane of sediment accretion

	PARAMETER						
MATERIAL	γ (pcf)	¢	c (psf)	Kh (ft/hr)	Kh (cm/s)	Kv/Kh	•
Fill	105	0	900	1.17E-04	9.91E-07	1	0.35
Upper CH	95	0	800	2.00E-04	1.69E-06	0.333	0.35
Upper Marsh	85	28	0	1.10E+00	9.31E-03	0.25	0.5
OC Grey CH	95	0	500	2.00E-04	1.69E-06	0.333	0.35
NC Grey CH	95	0	Su/p: 0.28	2.00E-04	1.69E-06	0.333	0.35
Lower Marsh	85	28	0	1.10E+00	9.31E-03	0.25	0.5
Silt	110	0	600	1.17E-04	9.91E-07	0.333	0.41
Lean Clay	100	0	600	2.00E-04	1.69E-06	0.333	0.38
Sands	120	30	0	1.00E+00	8.5E-03	0.5	0.42
Gaps				100		10	1

\* Fredlund et al, Green and Corey, Van Genuchten



Distance

Geotechnical cross-section for conventional limit equilibrium and coupled seepage analyses of the east bank IHNC south breach.

#### Hydrographs on IHNC



The horizontal permeability in the pervious marsh deposits likely varies between  $1 \times 10^{-3}$  and  $1 \times 10^{-6}$  cm/sec., locally (within the marsh stratum), depending on a number of factors.



## Finite difference mesh for seepage analyses for east bank IHNC south breach.



## Pressure contours for the south breach on IHNC with storm surge at 14.4ft (MSL).

## Hydraulic gradients for piping and uplift



• Hydraulic gradients for the south breach on IHNC east bank; storm surge at 14.4ft (MSL). Maximum exit gradient at the levee toe is  $i_o \approx 0.8$  to 1.0, at threshold for hydraulic piping.

• This may help to explain the persistent wet spot noted on the backfill of the Jourdan Avenue conduit backfill for weeks afterward.



Aerial view of the south breach at the east bank of the IHNC (at the west end of the Ninth Ward), showing the 'wet spot' along the inboard side and the crevasse splay generated by reverse drainage flow. [Photograph by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers]

Slope Stability Analysis of East IHNC South Breach Embankment

### **Embankment Stability of East IHNC South Breach**



Geometry and input parameters for FEM (PLAXIS) stability analyses for Lower Ninth Ward, IHNC East Bank, South Breach.



## Finite difference mesh for seepage analyses for east bank IHNC south breach.



## Pressure contours for the south breach on IHNC with storm surge at 14.4ft (MSL).



Normalized shear strain contours (shear strain divided by strain to failure) for a storm surge at Elev. + 14 feet (MSL) on the east IHNC south breech; gapping at outboard toe of floodwall is fully developed.



Estimated range in pore pressures at top of lower marsh unit assuming a range of horizontal hydraulic conductivity (k) in the marsh units, varying between 10<sup>-3</sup> and 10<sup>-6</sup> cm/sec



Estimated range in pore pressures at top of lower marsh unit *if the flood wall developed a gap*; assuming a range of horizontal hydraulic conductivity (k) in the marsh units, varying *between 10<sup>-3</sup> and 10<sup>-6</sup> cm/sec* 



Increase of pore pressure at top of lower marsh unit if the gap on water side of flood wall opened around 7:30 AM. This would have hastened the build-up of pore pressure at this location.

## Slope stability – shallow failure mode (in upper marsh) – FS=1.091



### Limit equilibrium analyses

## Deep failure mode (in lower marsh) with wall gap- FS=0.985



Deeper slope failure most likely, with k values as low as 3 x 10<sup>-5</sup> cm/sec; with wall gap forming around 7:30 AM, at a water level of 13 ft (MSL).

This would appear to be the best explanation for a massive translational failure, 800 feet long.



Calculated Factors of Safety for three modes based on SLOPE/W analyses of the East Bank IHNC South Breach site for various surge levels; showing the best-estimated path to failure.

## This lecture will be posted at

### www.mst.edu/~rogersda/levees

# in .pdf format for easy downloading and use by others.